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Abstract—Federated learning enables multiple, distributed
participants (potentially on different clouds) to collaborate
and train machine/deep learning models by sharing param-
eters/gradients. However, sharing gradients, instead of central-
izing data, may not be as private as one would expect. Reverse
engineering attacks [1], [2] on plaintext gradients have been
demonstrated to be practically feasible. Existing solutions for
differentially private federated learning, while promising, lead
to less accurate models and require nontrivial hyperparameter
tuning.
In this paper, we examine the use of additive homomorphic
encryption (specifically the Paillier cipher) to design secure
federated gradient descent techniques that (i) do not require
addition of statistical noise or hyperparameter tuning, (ii) does
not alter the final accuracy or utility of the final model, (iii)
ensure that the plaintext model parameters/gradients of a
participant are never revealed to any other participant or third
party coordinator involved in the federated learning job, (iv)
minimize the trust placed in any third party coordinator and
(v) are efficient, with minimal overhead, and cost effective.
Keywords-federated learning, gradient descent, aggregator,
additive homomorphic encryption
I. INTRODUCTION
Some of the early success of distributed machine/deep
learning (ML/DL) in several application domains [3], [4] has
been in the context of massive centralized data collection,
either at a single datacenter or a cloud service. However,
centralized data collection at a (third-party) cloud service can
be incredibly privacy-invasive, and can expose organizations
(customers of the cloud service) to large legal liability when
there is a data breach. This is especially true in the case of
healthcare data, voice transcripts, home cameras, financial
transactions, etc. Centralized data collection often results in
“loss of control” over data once it is uploaded – “Is the cloud
service using my data as promised? Is it actually deleting my
data when it claims to do so?”. Organizations that have not
been convinced by privacy violations and loss of control, have
been forced by governmental regulations (like HIPAA and
GDPR [5]) to restrict data sharing with third party services.
Federated learning (FL) aims to mitigate the three afore-
mentioned issues, while maintaining accuracy of ML/DL
models. An entity in an FL job can be as small as a smart
phone/watch or as large as an organization with multiple data
centers. An FL algorithm aims to train a ML/DL model, e.g.,
a specific neural network model or an XGBoost model, on
multiple entities, each with its own “local” dataset, without
exchanging any data. This results in multiple “local models”,
which are then combined (aggregated) by exchanging only
parameters (e.g., the weights of the a neural network model).
An FL algorithm may use a central co-ordinator to collect
parameters of all local models for aggregation; or it may be
a peer-to-peer algorithm (broadcast, overlay multicast, etc.)
Exchanging parameters of the model was thought to
provide privacy for free, and reduce the amount of trust
that a participant in a federated learning job has to place in
the co-ordinator or in other participants. But, researchers have
demonstrated [1], [2], [6] through so-called model inversion
and membership inference attacks that parameters of a model
can be used to reconstruct data from which they are derived.
So the challenge in federated learning is to ensure the privacy
of the model parameters and gradients.
It has been demonstrated [7], [8] that statistical noise,
when added in specific ways to (clipped) gradients before
being sent out for aggregation, can ensure corresponding
levels differential privacy (recall that differential privacy is a
probabilistic guarantee). However, the same papers [7], [8]
also demonstrate that achieving differential privacy results in
non-trivial loss of model accuracy. Furthermore, increasing
differential privacy reduces accuracy. Also, for a specific
level of differential privacy, accuracy depends on careful
hyperparameter selection (learning rate, batch size and
gradient clip values). This can be tricky because not all
batch sizes which are generally "acceptable" for training a
specific neural net model in a non-private manner give the
best accuracy in a differentially private setting. Combined
with learning rate and clipping thresholds, the state space of
hyperparameter exploration quickly becomes large.
In this paper, we present MYSTIKO, a system for cloud-
mediated, private federated deep learning based on gradient
descent. This paper makes the following technical contribu-
tions:
1) A novel cryptographic key generation and sharing
technique that uses additive homomorphic encryption
(specifically the Paillier cipher [9]) to maximize privacy
of federated gradient descent in training deep neural
networks without any loss of accuracy.
2) A novel protocol to arrange participants in a ring, and
structure communication between them so that non-
aggregated plaintext gradients are never revealed to
any participant or co-ordinator.






















All-Reduce protocols, for increased efficiency.
4) A detailed empirical evaluation of MYSTIKO against
differential privacy schemes (added statistical noise)
and state-of-the-art secure multiparty computation
protocols, using realistic datasets and neural network
models. We demonstrate performance improvements of
up to 6.1× when compared to the SPDZ protocol [10].
II. FOCUS, TRUST MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
We focus on the scenario where each participant is con-
vinced of the benefits (improvements in accuracy, robustness,
etc.) of federated learning. Each participant is convinced
enough that it follows the steps of the federation protocol
and does not collude with the co-ordinator to break the
protocol. But the participant may be curious about the data
of others, and it may be in their interest to reverse-engineer
the model parameters to try and discover other participants’
data. We also assume that the co-ordinator is honest, but
curious with respect to individual participant’s data. The
particpants want to reduce the required amount of trust in
the coordinator as much as possible. Specifically, we assume
that each participant does not attempt to poison or skew the
global model by maliciously generating weights.
Examples/Use Cases: This trust model is predominantly
found in enterprise federated learning. A multinational bank
having branches in multiple countries and so regulated
locally (BankA, BankA US, BankA UK, BankA India, etc.),
where the bank wants to learn a fraud detection model
across data of all its subsidiaries, but the data can not be
transfered to a central location due to governmental data
sovereignty/jurisdiction laws [5]. Each participant here is a
subsidiary with its national data center(s) and the coordinator
might be located in a cloud platform or a global datacenter.
Another example is a set of hospitals who want to collaborate
to train a tumor detection model; each hospital is unable
to trust the others and unwilling to trust and transfer data
to a central service. Another example is a cloud-hosted
machine learning service (e.g., Azure ML) which has multiple
(competing) corporate clients which do not trust each other
but have some level of trust in the cloud service to facilitate
and secure federated learning.
III. BACKGROUND
Gradient Descent [11]: Throughout this paper, we focus
on deep neural network training algorithms which rely on
distributed gradient descent (including optimized variants
like Adam, Adagrad [11], etc.). We assume that there are
P parties, each learning on its own dataset. It is well
known that gradient descent is a popular optimization
algorithm to minimize the loss for an objective function J(θ)
parameterized by a model’s parameters θ ∈ Rd by updating
the parameters at every step (θ = θ − η ∇θ J(θ)) The
frequency of model updates varies with the type of gradient
descent: the gradient is computed on the whole dataset in
the case of plain gradient descent, on each data item in the
case of stochastic gradient descent (SGD) and on a small
batch of items in the case of mini-batch gradient descent.
In a distributed setting, each participant computes ∇θ J(θ)
on a batch from its dataset, and these gradient vectors are
averaged before updating the model parameters θ. That is,
either each participant broadcasts its gradients ∇θ J(θ) to
all other participants (using all-to-all broadcast or optimized
all-reduce) or sends its gradients to a central co-ordinator
for averaging. The averaged gradients from iteration t are
then used to update model parameters in iteration t+ 1 to
compute the model parameters of iteration t+ 1.
Additive Homomorphic Encryption: Homomorphic en-
cryption allows computation on ciphertexts, generating an
encrypted result which, when decrypted, matches the result
of the operations as if they had been performed on the plain-
text [12]. Fully homomorphic encryption is expensive, both
in terms of encryption/decryption time as well as the size of
the ciphertext. However, averaging gradient vectors requires
only addition (division by the total number of participants
can be done before or after encrypted aggregation). Hence,
we employ additive homomorphic encryption like the Paillier
cryptosystem [9]. The Paillier cryptosystem is an asymmetric
algorithm for public key cryptography. Given only the public
key and the encryption of m1 and m2, one can compute the
encryption of m1 + m2.





















Figure 1. Topology establishment and Key Distribution
The main characteristics of any privacy preserving feder-
ated learning scheme revolves around a) what methodology
is used to encrypt the data (or noise addition) of the
participants and b) the communication protocol being used
among the participants and the co-ordinator (if any) for
aggregation of the model parameters or gradients. We present
a novel approach, MYSTIKO in which all participants encrypt
individual data using a single Paillier public encryption
key, adding encrypted gradient vectors and decrypting only
the sum. Thus, only the participants are able to view their
individual data, ensuring privacy. The question now is (1) how































Figure 2. Basic Aggregation Protocol Over a Ring Topology
while keeping the corresponding private key secret?, and (2)
how to prevent anyone from decrypting individual weights?
These are explained in the following sections.
A. Participants, Learners and Administrative Domains
Logically speaking, it is helpful to define federated
learning algorithms in terms of administrative domains.
An administrative domain is a set of computing entities
(servers, VMs, desktops, laptops, etc.). Each entity inside
an administrative domain trusts the other, malice is not
a concern, and there are no legal/regulatory hurdles to
sharing data and information derived from data. Note that
an administrative domain does not necessarily mean a
company or a non-corporate organization. It may be a project
within a company handling confidential data; it may be
not be located within a corporate datacenter, and instead
be associated with an account on the public cloud. An
organization can have multiple administrative domains. Each
participant in a federated learning algorithm corresponds
to an administrative domain. Computationally, the actual
learning process (typically running on a GPU) performing
the neural network training is called a Learner. Each Learner
works on (a batch of) data within the participant to compute
the gradient vector.
B. Architecture
For simplicity, we assume that there is exactly one learner
per participant. We will relax this assumption in Section V-D.
MYSTIKO is typically deployed as a cloud service that
mediates several participants. It involves a Job Manager,
Membership Manager, a Key Generator and a Decryptor.
The Membership Manager is responsible for establishing the
relationship between each participant and MYSTIKO, and also
keeping track of participants that belong to each federated
learning job. The Job Manager manages an FL job through
its lifecycle – it keeps track of participants, helps participants
agree on hyperparameters, detects failures and updates to
memberships.
C. Communication Security
While the focus of this paper is attacks on the privacy of
data from within a federation, traditional communications
security is nevertheless essential to prevent outside attacks
on the federation. For this, MYSTIKO and the participants
(learners) agree to use a common public-key infrastruc-
ture (PKI) [13]. The PKI helps ensure confidentiality of
communications between the MYSTIKO components and
the learners, and helps bootstrap the Paillier infrastructure.
The PKI provides certification authorities (CAs), along with
corresponding intermediate and Root CAs, creating a web of
trust between the learners and MYSTIKO. MYSTIKO creates a
bidirectional TLS channel [14] using the PKI for the security
of control messages. The TLS channel is created using strong,
but ordinary (non-homomorphic) cryptographic algorithms
(e.g., RSA for key exchange/agreement and authentication,
AES for message confidentiality and SHA for message
authentication [13], [14]). The TLS channel is not used for
gradient aggregation, but rather for all other communications,
like registration of learners with the MYSTIKO topology
formation, rank assignment, transmitting the Paillier public
key to each learner, and transmitting the decrypted aggregated
gradient vector to each learner.
V. ALGORITHMS
A. Basic Ring-based Algorithm
The basic ring-based aggregation algorithm is illustrated
in Figures 1 and 2. This algorithm operates across P
participants, each in its own administrative domain and
represented by a learner (L). The algorithm starts with each
participant registering with MYSTIKO. MYSTIKO acts as the
coordinator. The learners need not fully trust MYSTIKO; they
only need to trust it to generate good encryption keypairs,
keep the private key secret and follow the protocol.
MYSTIKO’s Membership Manager starts the federated
learning protocol once all expected learners are registered.
The first step is to arrange the learners along a ring topology
(Figure 1). This can be done in several straightforward ways:
(i) by location – minimizing geographic distance between
participants, (ii) by following a hierarchy based on the name
of the participants (ascending or descending order), or (iii)
by using consistent hashing [15] on the name/identity of the
participants. Once the learners have been arranged in a ring,
each learner gets a rank (from 1 to P ) based on its position
in the ring.
MYSTIKO’s Paillier Key generator, which generates a
Paillier public- and private key pair for each federated
learning job. Typically, a unique Paillier key pair is generated
for each federated learning job, and the Paillier public
key securely distributed (over TLS) to all the learners. For
long jobs, a separate keypair may be generated either once
every epoch or once every h minutes (this is configurable).
MYSTIKO’s Decryptor is responsible for decrypting the
Paillier encrypted aggregated gradient vector for distribution
to the learners. Each learner receives a Paillier encrypted
gradient vector from the previous learners on the ring,
encrypts its own gradient vector with the Paillier public
key, and adds (aggregates) the two Paillier encrypted vectors.
This aggregated, Paillier encrypted gradient vector is then
transmitted to the next learner on the ring. The last learner
on the ring transmits the fully aggregated, encrypted gradient
vector to MYSTIKO for decryption. MYSTIKO’s Decryptor
decrypts the aggregated vector and transmits the same
securely over TLS to each of the learners.
Security Analysis: Data never leaves a learner, and by
extension any administrative domain. This ensures privacy of
data, provided each server inside the administrative domain
has adequate defenses against intrusion. Unencrypted gradient
vectors do not leave the learner. If there are P participants,
in P − 1 cases only aggregated Paillier encrypted gradient
vectors leave the learner. Only MYSTIKO has the private
key to decrypt these. For the first learner in the ring, the
non-aggregated gradient vector is transmitted to the second
learner, but it is Paillier encrypted, and cannot be decrypted
by the same. In fact, none of the participants are able to view
even partially aggregated gradient vectors. After decryption,
the aggregated gradient vector is distributed securely to the
participants over TLS. Reverse engineering attacks, like the
ones in [1] & [2] are intended to find the existence of a
specific data record in a participant, or to find data items that
lead to specific changes in gradient vectors; both of which are
extremely difficult when several gradient vectors computed
from large datasets are averaged [16]. Decryption after
averaging ensures the privacy of gradients. MYSTIKO only
sees aggregated gradients and can’t get access to individual
learner’s data or gradients.
Colluding Participants: The basic ring-based algorithm
is resistant to collusion among P − 2 participants. That is,
assuming an honest uncorrupted MYSTIKO deployment, it
can be broken only if P − 1 learners collude. For learner
Li’s gradients to be exposed, learners L1, L2, . . . , Li−1 and
Li+1, . . . , LP should collude, i.e., all of them should simply
pass on incoming encrypted gradient vector to the next learner,
without adding any gradient of their own.
Fault Tolerance: The disadvantage of a ring-based
aggregation algorithm is that rings can break; for good
performance, it is essential that the connectivity between
each learner and MYSTIKO remains strong. Traditional failure
detection techniques, based on heartbeats and estimation of
typical round-trip times may be used. Distributed synchronous
gradient descent consists of a number of iterations; with
gradients being averaged at the end of each iteration. If the
failure of a learner is detected, the averaging of gradient
vectors is paused until the learner is eliminated from the ring
by the MYSTIKO’s Membership Manager, or connection to
the learner is established again. Pausing gradient averaging
can also be done when connection to the MYSTIKO is
temporarily lost.
B. Broadcast Algorithm
One of the main drawbacks of the ring based algorithm
is the establishment and maintenance of the ring topology.
To mitigate this, an alternative is to use group membership
and broadcast. Except for the establishment of the topology,
the setting remains the same. Learners register with the
MYSTIKO’s Membership Manager; agree on a common PKI
and know the identity and number of participants. MYSTIKO
generates a Paillier public-private key pair for each federated
job and distributes the public key securely to each learner.
Each learner Paillier-encrypts its gradient vector, and
broadcasts the encrypted vector to all other learners. Each
learner, upon receipt of encrypted vectors from P − 1
learnerss, adds them, and sends the Paillier-encrypted sum
to the MYSTIKO for decryption. After decryption, the
aggregated gradient vector is transmitted securely to all
learners over TLS. The broadcast algorithm is redundant
and wasteful, as every learner computes the aggregate. But,
with redundancy comes increased failure resiliency. With the
ring, the failure of one participant can lead to partial loss of
aggregated gradients, which is not the case for broadcast.
Colluding Participants: The objective of breaking this
algorithm is to determine the plaintext gradient vector of
a specific LA. This algorithm is resistant to collusion, and
can be broken only if P − 1 participants collude, which is
highly unlikely. Also, in the event that P − 1 participants
collude to Paillier encrypt zero-vectors instead of their actual
gradient vectors, the broadcasted Paillier ciphertexts from
all the P − 1 learners will be the same, which serves as a
red flag enabling collusion detection. In fact, given that data
is likely to be different at each participant, getting exactly
the same Paillier encrypted gradient vector from even two
learners is red flag.
C. All-Reduce
Ring-based All-Reduce [17] is essentially a parallel
version of the ring based aggregation protocol described
in Section V-A. It is illustrated in Fig. 3. The problem with
the basic ring protocol in Section V-A is that each learner
has to wait for its predecessor. However, in All-Reduce, the
Paillier encrypted gradient vector is divided into P chunks
where P is the number of participants. All learners then
aggregate Paillier encrypted chunks in parallel. For example,
in Fig. 3, there are three learners, and the gradient vectors are
divided into three chunks each. Learner-2 does not wait for
the entire vector of Learner-1 to be received. Instead, while it
is receiving the first chunk of Learner-1, it transmits its own
second chunk to Learner-3, which in parallel, transmits its
third chunk to Learner-3. In Step 2, Learner-2 transmits the
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Figure 4. Federating Gradient Descent
partially aggregated chunk-2 to Learner-1, which transmits
the partially aggregated chunk-3 to Learner-2. At the end
of Step-2, each learner has Paillier encrypted, aggregated
chunks, which are transmitted to MYSTIKO’s decryptor for
concatenation and decryption.
Security Analysis: We note that All-Reduce is the most
efficient MYSTIKO protocol. With P learners, All-Reduce is
essentially an instantiation of P − 1 rings (of Section V-A)
all operating in parallel. In Fig. 3, the first ring starts at the
first chunk of Learner-1, the second ring starts at the second
chunk of Learner-2 and the third starts at the third chunk
of Learner-3. This implies that the security guarantees of
All-Reduce are the same as that of the basic ring protocol.
D. Multiple Learners Per Admin. Domain
For presentation simplicity, we have assumed that there
is exactly one learning process (learner) per participant.
More realistically, within an administrative domain, data
is partitioned among servers and multiple training processes
(learners), which periodically synchronize their gradient
vectors using an aggregator process local to the administrative
domain. This is done for various reasons, including datasets
being large, compute resources being cheap and available
and the desire to reduce training time. MYSTIKO’s protocols
can be applied in a straightforward manner to this case, with
MYSTIKO’s protocols running between Local Aggregators
(LAs) instead of between learners. Local aggregation is
not Paillier encrypted, and non-private because compute
resources within an administrative domain are trusted and can
share even raw data. But aggregation between LAs follows




# Parties All Reduce Broadcast Ring SPDZ
20 1 6.4-7.2× 38.2-39.9× 13.1-14.2×
40 1 7.9-8.6× 70.5-80.8× 13.8-14.7×
Total synchronization time
MYSTIKO
# Parties All Reduce Broadcast Ring SPDZ
20 1 12-51% 27-100% 2.2-6.1×
40 1 6-25% 15-59% 1.3-2.6×
Table I
PERFORMANCE SLOWDOWN OF BROADCAST, RING AND SPDZ
RELATIVE TO ALLREDUCE. FULL TREND AVAILABLE AT FIG. 5
We compare all the three Mystiko algorithms with a state
of the art protocol for secure multi-party computation –
SPDZ [10], [18], [19], and schemes for differential privacy
(DP) through the addition of statistical noise.
A. Implementation
We have implemented MYSTIKO and all its protocols in
Python and C++, using appropriate libraries for PKI and
communications security. We use the ETCD [20] key value
store to store metadata about federated jobs, and ETCD
leases for failure detection of learners. We have implemented
an optimized version of the Paillier cipher following the
improvements outlined in [9]. In all our experiments, we
use PyTorch for training on the learner side. We have also
integrated PyTorch on the learner side to work with the
implementation of SPDZ2k from MP-SPDZ [10] for gradient
synchronization..
B. Models and Datasets
We employ a variety of image processing neural network
models and datasets of various sizes: (i) 5-Layer CNN (small,
1MB) trained on MNIST dataset (60K handwritten digit


















































5-Layer CNN + MNIST





















































Figure 5. Total Synchronization time (seconds) vs. Number of Parties (top plots) and Total communication time (seconds) vs. Number of Parties (bottom).
Recall that Total Synchronization time is the sum of the communication time and the gradient transformation time.
5-Layer CNN + MNIST SVHN+Resnet-18 CIFAR100+Resnet-50 Imagenet+VGG-16
System Synch. Epoch Synch. Epoch Synch. Epoch Synch. Epoch









SPDZ 1.1s 150.5s 305.8s 1710.9s
MYSTIKO Ring 3.4s 256.5s 599.6s 3064.9
MYSTIKO Broadcast 0.84s 129.8s 270.7ss 1515.7s
MYSTIKO All-Reduce 0.56s 115.3s 240.6s 1345.5s
Table II
SYNCHRONIZATION TIME VS. TRAINING TIME (FOR 1 EPOCH ON 1 V100 GPU). 40 PARTICIPANT CASE.
images) (ii) Resnet-18 (small-medium, 50MB) trained on
the SVHN dataset (600K street digit images), (iii) Resnet-
50 (medium-sized model, 110 MB) trained on CIFAR-100
dataset (60K color images of 100 classes) and (iv) VGG-16
(large model, 600MB) trained on Imagenet-1K dataset (14.2
million images of 1000 classes).
C. Experimental Setup
Experiments were conducted on a 40 machine cluster
to evaluate all the algorithms on a varying number of
participants from 2 to 40. No more than one participant
was ever run on any machine, each of which was equipped
with 8 Intel Xeon E5-4110 (2.10 GHz) cores, 64GB RAM,
1 NVIDIA V100 GPU and a 10GbE network link. The
machines were spread over four datacenters, and in every
experiment, participants were uniformly distributed across
datacenters. In every experiment, the dataset was uniformly
and randomly partitioned across participants. Mystiko was
executed on a dedicated machine in one datacenter. All data
points henceforth are computed by averaging 10 experiment
runs.
D. MYSTIKO vs. DP Noise Addition [7], [8], [16]
It has been already demonstrated [16] that while addition
of differentially private noise mitigates membership infer-
ence [6] and reverse engineering [1], [2] attacks, the resulting
model has significantly lower accuracy as illustrated in Fig. 6.
In Fig. 6, the differential privacy parameter is ε, and the peak




















Accuracy for different privacy levels
MNIST+5-Layer CNN
SVHN+Resnet-18
Figure 6. Reduction in validation accuracy when differentially private
noise [7], [8] is added. MYSTIKO and SPDZ do not add noise, and hence
always achieves peak accuracy.
accuracy for a given ε value corresponds to one achieved
by trying different combinations of learning rate and batch
size. Acceptable levels of differential privacy are achieved
for ε ≤ 1, and values less than 0.1 are preferred for
neural network training because gradients are exposed over
thousands of synchronization steps. We observe from Fig. 6
that even for simple datasets and neural network models,
loss of accuracy is significant. Noise addition is also not
computationally cheap (298.5s vs. 43.6s per epoch in the
case of SVHN+Resnet-18).
E. Comparing MYSTIKO and SPDZ
In federated learning, learners (or local aggregators) learn
on local data for a specific number of iterations before
federated gradient aggregation and model update. Privacy
loss happens during gradient aggregation, which is where
MYSTIKO and other systems like SPDZ intervene. Hence,
we use the following two metrics to evaluate MYSTIKO and
SPDZ: (i) Total synchronization time, which measures the
total time needed for privacy preserving gradient transfor-
mations (Paillier encryption in MYSTIKO, share generation
in SPDZ, etc.) and the time required to communicate the
transformed gradients to participants for federation, and (ii)
communication time, which only measures communication
time.
Figures 5 plots total synchronization time and commu-
nication time against the number for parties involved in
federation, for all of our model/dataset combinations. From
Fig. 5, we observe that All-Reduce is the most scalable of
all the protocols, as the number of participants increases.
This is mainly because it is a parallel protocol, where each
learner/LA is constantly transmitting a small portion of the
gradient array. The basic ring protocol is the least scalable,
because it is sequential. Broadcast performs and scales better
than the basic ring protocol because each participant is
broadcasting without waiting for the others. SPDZ performs
and scales worse than broadcast because its communication
pattern is close to (but not exactly) a dual broadcast – each
item of the gradient vector at each participant is split into
secret shares and broadcast to the other participants; after
secure aggregation, the results are broadcast back. MYSTIKO
obviates the need for dual broadcast through the use of
Paillier encryption and centralized decryption of aggregated
gradients. Table I illustrates the performance impact of using
other protocols for two cases (20 and 40 parties from Fig. 5).
However, the “enormous” speedups of using All-Reduce do
not materialize in the total synchronization reduce when total
synchronization time is considered. The scalability trends
among the four protocols remain the same; the speedups in
total synchronization time remain significant (as elucidated
for two cases in Table I). But the speedups are lower than
the speedups due to communication. This demonstrates that
the predominant overhead of private gradient descent in
MYSTIKO and SPDZ vs. non-private gradient descent is
gradient transformation prior to communication. From Fig. 5
and Table I, we also observe that for small models (5-Layer
CNN & Resnet-18), communication time plays a larger role.
But for large models (Resnet-50 and VGG-16), gradient
transformation plays a larger role.
Lastly, we observe from Table II that when compared to
training time (illustrated using epoch time), synchronization
time for private gradient descent is significantly larger
than non-private gradient descent. This is primarily because
training happens on V100 GPUs (with thousands of cores)
while gradient transformation happens on CPUs. While
there is a GPU accelerated version of fully homomorphic
encryption ( [21] which has worse performance than Paillier
on CPUs), we are not aware of any GPU accelerated version
of the Paillier algorithm.
VII. RELATED WORK
Research on secure and private federated learning and
gradient descent is predominantly based either on (1) clever
use of cryptography – homomorphic encryption and secure
multi-party computation [18], [19], [22], [25]–[29], or on
(2) modifying model parameters or gradients through the
addition of statistical noise to get differential privacy [7], [8],
[30]. Some techniques [23], [24] combine both.
We compare our proposed algorithms with other techniques
in Table III. We observe that no technique is perfect – each
has pros and cons, which must be carefully considered based
on the deployment environment. We examine whether each
algorithm (i) requires fully-trusted peers or whether it can
work with honest+curious peers, (ii) impact on final model
validation accuracy, (iii) synchronization overheads (due to
encryption and other aspects of the algorithms), and (iv)
number of participants that must collude to violate the privacy
guarantees of the protocol (assuming P total participants).
Work Accuracy Synch. Min # of Peers assumed to be
Overhead Colluding parties
(to violate privacy)
Aono et.al. [22] Unch. Moderate 1 Trusted
(ENC Only)
Diff. Priv. Honest
Abadi et.al. [8] Lower Moderate P − 1 curious
Song et.al. [7] (NA only)
HybridAlpha [23] Lower High P − 1 Honest
Turex et.al. [24] Lower High P − t− 1 Curious
SPDZ variants
[18], [19] Unch. High P-1 Honest
[25], [26] (Sec. VI) Curious
MYSTIKO Unch. High P-1 Honest
Ring, Broadcast (Sec. VI) Curious
MYSTIKO Unch. Moderate P-1 Honest
All-Reduce (Sec. VI) Curious
Table III
COMPARING MYSTIKO WITH THE STATE OF THE ART. ENC MEANS PAILLIER ENCRYPTION, NA MEANS DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY THROUGH NOISE
ADDITION. BASED ON THE EXPERIMENTS IN SECTION VI, WE RELATIVELY CHARACTERIZE THE OVERHEAD OF PAILLIER ENCRYPTION WITH
ALL-REDUCE AS “MODERATE”, NOISE ADDITION WITH ALL-REDUCE AS “MODERATE”, AND COMBINATIONS OF BOTH ENCRYPTION AND NOISE
ADDITION AS “HIGH”
The closest related work to our algorithms is from Aono et.
al. [22], [27], where the participants jointly generate a Paillier-
keypair; send the encrypted gradient vectors to the coordinator
who is completely untrusted, except to add Paillier encrypted
weights. The participants can then decrypt the aggregated
gradient vectors. This, however, requires each participant
to collaborate with the others to generate the Paillier keys
and a high level of trust that participants do not collude
with the untrusted coordinator to decrypt individual gradient
vectors. One untrusted participant can leak the Paillier keys
and potentially lead to privacy loss.
Adding statistical noise to gradients has been proposed
in [7], [8], [30] among other literature [23], [24]. If noise
is added in a manner that guarantees differential privacy of
the gradient vectors, the gradients can be released publicly
to the other participants and the public. In this sense, these
techniques work with any type of participant or coordinator.
Although computation overhead is moderate, accuracy of the
final model takes a hit as demonstrated in Section VI, and
these techniques require careful hyperparameter selection to
keep the loss of accuracy minimal.
Secure multi-party computation (SMC) is a subfield of
cryptography with the goal of creating methods for parties
to jointly compute a function over their inputs while keeping
those inputs private. Unlike traditional cryptographic tasks,
where cryptography assures security and integrity of commu-
nication or storage and the adversary is outside the system
of participants (an eavesdropper on the sender and receiver),
the cryptography in this model protects participants’ privacy
from each other. SPDZ [19], and its variants (Overdrive [25],
[18], [26]) optimizes classic SMC protocols. The advantage
of such protocols is that they work with any number of
honest+curious peers, do not change final accuracy of the
trained model, and require a large number of colluding
peers to break. The drawback, however, is efficiency – SMC
protocols are computationally expensive (Section VI).
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Through MYSTIKO, we have demonstrated that private,
federated gradient descent without loss of accuracy can be
practical with reasonable synchronization overhead. MYS-
TIKO is the first federated learning platform to provide the
same security and privacy guarantees of a state-of-the-art
secure multiparty computation protocol (MP-SPDZ [10]) with
significantly lower synchronization overhead and by using
only Paillier encryption. Another important characteristic of
MYSTIKO is that it is simple to understand, implement and
explain to users (vis-a-vis protocols like SPDZ). However,
we do observe that synchronization time remains large with
respect to epoch time for many models. We believe that
this can be mitigated by effectively accelerating Paillier
encryption using GPUs, and this is a topic of active research
in our organization.
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